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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Land disputes are some of the trickiest obstacles to transitional justice 
today.  For many communities seeking to rebuild from armed conflict and 
mass displacement, real estate functions not only as the socio-cultural, 
economic, and political bedrock of society, but also as a wellspring of 
vulnerability, insecurity, and crime.1  Where conflicts over land ownership 
are characterized by power imbalances and bad faith, mediators look less like 
passive facilitators and more like bomb squads sent in to keep things from 
exploding. 
Increasingly, both national and international actors recognize the criminal 
nature of illegal land acquisitions.2  “Land grabbing,” as the practice is 
commonly known, refers to “[t]he acquisition of land by a public, private 
enterprise, or individual in a manner that is illegal, fraudulent, or unfair, 
taking advantage of existing power differences, corruption, and breakdown 
of law and order in the society.”3  Of these breakdowns, the widespread 
disregard and marginalization of customary forms of land holding is among 
the most systemic.4  As a result, to local authorities in some jurisdictions, the 
stealing of real property held under formal tenure is theft; stealing the same 
property held under customary tenure is but a mere dispute. 
The recognition of land grabbing’s criminal undertones, however, has not 
fully extended into practice.5  In transitional contexts like northern Uganda, 
                                                                                                                   
 1 INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE MISSION, PROPERTY GRABBING FROM UGANDAN WIDOWS AND 
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM: A MIXED-METHODS ASSESSMENT IN MUKONO COUNTY, UGANDA 17 
(2004); see also INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (ICTJ), Transitional 
Justice and Displacement: Challenges and Recommendation (2012), https://ictj.org/sites/defa 
ult/files/ICTJ%20and%20Brookings-LSE%20Transitional%20Justice%20and%20Displacem 
ent%20Report.pdf.  
 2 Lorenzo Cotula, The New Enclosures? Polanyi, International Investment Law and the 
Global Land Rush, in GLOBAL LAND GRABS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND METHOD, 89, 90–96 
(Marc Edelman, C. Oya & S. Borras eds., 2015). 
 3 SAMUEL MABIKKE, ESCALATING LAND GRABBING IN POST-CONFLICT REGIONS OF 
NORTHERN UGANDA: A NEED FOR STRENGTHENING GOOD LAND GOVERNANCE IN ACHOLI 
REGION 15 (Land Deal Politics Initiative 2011).    
 4 SIMON LEVINE ET AL., WHAT LITTLE THEY HAVE WILL BE TAKEN: HOW THE SYSTEMATIC 
VIOLATION OF LAND RIGHTS IN NORTHERN UGANDA IS ALLOWED TO RUN UNCHECKED (Land 
and Equity Movement in Uganda, Lango Cultural Foundation, Iteso Cultural Union, 
Norwegian Refugee Council, Trócaire, Lutheran World Federation, Justice and Peace 
Commission Soroti Archdiocese 2008).  
 5 See International Land Coalition, Tirana Declaration: Securing Land Access for the Poor 
in Times of Intensified Natural Resources Competition (May 26, 2011), http://www.landcoalit 
ion.org/sites/default/files/documents/resources/tiranadeclaration.pdf (acknowledging ongoing 
land grabbing at local, national, and international levels); see also International Land 
Coalition, Antigua Declaration, ¶ 4 (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.landcoalition.org/en/resource 
es/antigua-declaration (“We voice our concern at the extreme vulnerability of many 
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where evidence of land ownership is hard to obtain due to weak 
administration and lack of reliable titles after twenty-six years of war 
between the government and the so-called Lord’s Resistance Army,6 law 
enforcement tends to adopt a hands-off approach to land disputes.7  The 
reason given is that land conflicts are considered civil domestic matters in 
which state law enforcement should not intervene—unless and until a more 
readily verifiable type of crime occurs, such as robbery, assault, malicious 
property damage, or murder.8  
When such a crime related to a land dispute does occur, the individuals 
arrested may or may not be the perpetrators of the underlying land grabbing 
attempt.  Instead, victims and even bystanders may be rounded up, put in jail, 
and left there on remand indefinitely.9  Meanwhile, tension in the community 
can continue to build while the underlying land conflict remains 
unresolved.10  The following quotes from stakeholders in northern Uganda 
illustrate this tension: 
 They drove a tractor right through our clan meeting.  We ran, 
and they chased some of us, claiming we had ransacked their 
                                                                                                                   
Indigenous Peoples to land grabbing and criminalisation of customary forms of land and 
natural resource use, particularly in contexts of extractive industries, conservation areas and 
commercial agriculture.”). 
 6 MARGARET A. RUGADYA, ESCALATING LAND CONFLICTS IN UGANDA: A REVIEW OF 
EVIDENCE FROM RECENT STUDIES AND SURVEYS 23 (International Republican Institute and 
Uganda Round Table Foundation 2009). 
 7 See, e.g., Vinod Rajput, Police ‘Inaction’ for 6 Years Forced Greater Noida Family to 
Strip, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Oct. 10, 2015), http://www.hindustantimes.com/noida/land-dispute-
police-inaction-for-six-years-forced-greater-noida-family-to-strip/story-zu2MCZUKgQrEuT 
MBwhp65H.html; DANIEL WILLIAMS, THERE ARE NO INVESTIGATIONS HERE: IMPUNITY FOR 
KILLINGS AND OTHER ABUSES IN BAJO AGUÁN, HONDURAS (Human Rights Watch 2014), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/02/12/there-are-no-investigations-here/impunity-killings-an 
d-other-abuses-bajo-aguan.  
 8 Northern Uganda Land Platform Policy Brief, On Police Response to Land Crimes Under 
S.92 of the 1998 Land Act (Sept. 2014) (on file with author); see also ICTJ, supra note 1, at 5 
(“National criminal justice systems often focus on the crimes connected to displacement rather 
than the crime of displacement itself: displacement is often seen as a natural consequence of 
other crimes or as an inherent effect of armed conflict, and as a result, there are few 
investigations of the criminality or rationale of the multiple actors involved in these crimes.”). 
 9 See JEREMY AKIN, POWER & VULNERABILITY IN LAND DISPUTE RESOLUTION: EVALUATING 
RESPONSES TO DOMESTIC LAND GRABBING IN NORTHERN UGANDA 42 (Northern Uganda Land 
Platform 2014), http://www.landcoalition.org/en/publications/power-vulnerability-land-disput 
e-resolution. 
 10 Id. at 11 (finding that “[a]t times, groups as large as 36, 48, or over 80 people are 
rounded up, arrested and put on remand for the same land-related case”).  In the case referred 
to in the quote, a wealthy businessman allegedly began surveying community-owned land in 
order to claim it for his personal use. 
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supplies of survey equipment.  Then the police came and 
arrested fourteen of us for aggravated robbery. We’ve been 
here four months on remand, too poor to pay bond.11 
—Prison Inmate, age 26 
 Anger continues at home while some [community members] 
are incarcerated. Because the [clan] has a bad heart: Why did 
you take our son or daughter only? Why not take all of us? 
Mediation should be done instantly, should begin immediately 
rather than wait for [the dispute] to go from bad to worse.12  
—Officer in Charge, Kitgum Police Station 
 
In recent decades, the field of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has 
grown beyond its civil and juvenile origins and is now practiced in a variety 
of misdemeanor and property cases in jurisdictions worldwide.13  Little is 
understood, however, about the efficacy of ADR in promoting criminal 
accountability and reconciliation in foreign transitional justice contexts.14  
This Note analyzes the potential, limits, and feasibility of criminal ADR, 
especially victim-offender mediation, to undergird tenure security as a pillar 
of crime prevention in settings rife with land grabbing, in accordance with 
the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.15  Drawing upon lessons 
                                                                                                                   
 11 Interview with (name withheld), male inmate age twenty-six, in Gov’t Prison, Gulu, 
Uganda (May 5, 2013). 
 12 Statement by (name withheld), Officer in Charge, Kitgum Police Station, Northern 
Uganda Land Platform Stakeholder Forum (July 3, 2013).   
 13 See Mark S. Umbreit et al., Victim-Offender Mediation: Three Decades of Practice and 
Research, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 279, 281 (2004) (describing more than 300 such programs 
in the United States and over 1,200 similar programs throughout Europe, Canada, Israel, 
Japan, Russia, South Korea, South Africa, South America, and the South Pacific); see also 
American Bar Association (ABA), Mediation in Criminal Matters: An ABA Enterprise 
Project, Survey of ADR and Restorative Justice Programs (2016), http://www.americanbar. 
org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminaljustice/mediationsurvey.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 14 John Braithwaite, Narrative and “Compulsory Compassion,” 31 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 425, 
443–44 (2006) (observing that in some settings, “restorative justice can have large effects in 
reducing violent crime by as much as 40 percent, and in other contexts (for example, Aboriginal 
property offenders in the Canberra RISE experiments and some kinds of victims who did not get 
what they were looking for), restorative justice can be seriously counterproductive”). 
 15 See U.N. Sustainable Development Goal No. 16: Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions, 
Goal 16 Targets, http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/peace-justice/ (“By 2030 . . . 
strengthen the recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime” 
and “strengthen relevant national institutions . . . for building capacity at all levels, in 
particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and combat terrorism and crime.”). 
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from northern Uganda, this Note argues that criminal ADR may enhance 
existing local dispute resolution systems by confronting both the criminal 
and civil sides of a land grab attempt in one forum.  To be effective, 
however, criminal ADR must be complemented by clear police protocols, 
land rights analysis methods, community-wide land documentation, and 
quality control mechanisms for state and traditional land administrators and 
be facilitated by patient and skillful mediators. 
Part I of this Note identifies key aspects of the land grabbing problem, 
traces the development of criminal ADR, and suggests why a more effective 
strategy for land dispute intervention is needed in transitional justice contexts.  
Part II analyzes the legal framework for the design of these systems under the 
African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally 
Displaced Persons,16 U.N. Guidance for Effective Mediation,17 and Economic 
and Social Council Resolution on the Use of Restorative Justice Programs in 
Criminal Matters.18  Part III then concludes with an evaluation of the potential, 
limits, and feasibility of victim-offender mediation to systematically address 
bad faith land disputes in transitional societies such as northern Uganda. 
II.  LAND DISPUTES AS BOTH CIVIL AND CRIMINAL MATTERS 
Civil disputes over land and natural resources are globally recognized as 
both precursors and predictors of criminal activity within post-conflict 
communities.19  At the national level, states such as Kenya,20 Liberia,21 and 
                                                                                                                   
 16 African Union, Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced 
Persons in Africa (Oct. 23, 2009) [hereinafter Kampala Convention], http://www.au.int/en/treati 
es/african-union-convention-protection-and-assistance-internally-displaced-persons-africa.  As of 
June 2017, forty African States have signed to the Convention, while twenty-seven have ratified 
it.  Uganda ratified the Convention on Jan. 29, 2010. See https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/ 
7796-sl-african_union_convention_for_the_protection_and_assistance_of_internally.pdf.  
 17 U.N. Doc. A/66/811, Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Report of the Secretary General, annex at 20 
(June 25, 2012). 
 18 Economic and Social Council Res. 2002/12 (July 24, 2002). 
 19 See, e.g., ERICA GASTON & LILLIAN DANG, ADDRESSING LAND CONFLICT IN AFGHANISTAN 
372 (UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE 2015), https://www.usip.org/publications/2015/05/ 
addressing-land-conflict-afghanistan (“Disputes over land in Afghanistan have become one of 
the key drivers of conflict and criminal violence.”); CAMBODIAN CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
CAMBODIA’S WOMEN IN LAND CONFLICT 13 (2016), http://cchrcambodia.org/index_old.php?u 
rl=media/media.php&p=report_detail.php&reid=116&id=5 (“Women who experienced land 
conflicts were almost always subject to threats, harassment, arrest, or violence by the 
authorities or land concession actors.”).  
 20 LAND LAWS ACT (2016), Kenya Gazette, http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/ 
AmendmentActs/2016/LandLaws_Amendment_Act_28of2016.pdf; COMMUNITY LAND ACT 
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Uganda22 have enacted statutes criminalizing the occupation or acquisition of 
land without consent of the owners.  Internationally, the Chief Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Court has declared that her “office will give 
particular consideration to prosecuting Rome Statute crimes that are 
committed by means of, or that result in, inter alia, . . . the illegal 
dispossession of land” and “will also seek to cooperate and provide assistance 
to States . . . with respect to conduct which constitutes a serious crime under 
national law, such as . . . land grabbing.”23  This section identifies key aspects 
of the land grabbing problem and traces the development of criminal ADR, 
demonstrating why a more effective strategy for land dispute intervention is 
needed in transitional justice contexts like northern Uganda.  
A.  Land Grabbing in Context 
Customary, indigenous and communal lands account for approximately 
50% of the world’s total land area and are home to 2.5 billion people.24  The 
World Bank estimates that in Sub-Saharan Africa, the proportion of 
customary lands is 90%.25  In post-conflict areas such as northern Uganda, it 
is calculated at as much as 98.8%.26  Governance of these lands is directly 
tied to human and household security: where tenure is insecure, economic 
livelihoods, social fabrics, and future existences are as well.27  
Under customary tenure, land is held according to traditional norms of 
“ownership” particular to a given group of people.  The land is administered 
                                                                                                                   
(2016), KENYA GAZETTE, http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/CommunityLa 
ndAct27of2016.pdf. 
 21 ACT AGAINST CRIMINAL CONVEYANCE OF LAND (2014), Laws of Liberia, http://extwprle 
gs1.fao.org/docs/pdf/lbr146964.pdf. 
 22 LAND ACT, CAP. 227, § 91 (1998), Laws of Uganda, https://www.ulii.org/ug/legislation/ 
consolidated-act/227. 
 23 Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, Policy Paper on Case Selection 
and Prioritisation ¶¶ 7, 41 (Sept. 15, 2016). 
 24 FRED PEARCE, COMMON GROUND: SECURING LAND RIGHTS AND SAFEGUARDING THE 
EARTH: A GLOBAL CALL TO ACTION ON INDIGENOUS AND COMMUNITY LAND RIGHTS (Oxfam 
2016), http://www.landcoalition.org/en/resources/common-ground-securing-land-rights-and-s 
afeguarding-earth. 
 25 FRANK F.K. BYAMUGISHA, SECURING AFRICA’S LAND FOR SHARED PROSPERITY: A 
PROGRAM TO SCALE UP REFORMS AND INVESTMENTS 55 (World Bank and Agence Françoise de 
Developpement 2013), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/13837/ 
780850PUB0EPI00LIC00pubdate05024013.pdf?sequence=1. 
 26 See CHRISTOPHER BURKE & DOREEN KOBUSINGYE, SECURING WOMEN’S LAND AND 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN NORTHERN UGANDA (WEST NILE, ACHOLI, LANGO, TESO AND KARAMOJA) 
23 (Oxfam 2014), http://www.landcoalition.org/sites/default/files/documents/resources/Securi 
ng%20Women%20Land%20Rights%20Report_with%20covers%20_0.pdf.  
 27 See PEARCE, supra note 24. 
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orally and typically held without written records.28  This often means that 
multiple parties have distinct substantive claims, forming a bundle of diverse 
rights to the same piece of land.29  In post-colonial nations the world over, 
customary tenure continued a de facto existence despite periods of colonial 
rule.  In many cases, customary tenure won statutory—sometimes even 
constitutional—recognition after independence.30  Traditionally, land was 
rarely sold to outsiders; to do so would deplete the territorial assets, wealth, 
and power of the clan.31  With the advent of globalization, climate change, 
and the neoliberal commodification of land,32 national governments—
sometimes working through local elites—have willingly granted vast land 
concessions to foreign investors.33  
The 2007–2008 spike in world food prices saw agribusinesses worldwide 
join in a rush to acquire cheap land in other countries in order to reduce their 
costs of production and maximize profits.34  With a bundle of rights attached 
to each parcel, these land transactions are frequently disputed. As Guardian 
journalist Fred Pearce has explained: “In the majority of cases, the land 
involved was already owned, occupied and used by local communities and 
indigenous peoples.”35  With its weak land governance systems, Africa has 
been and continues to be the “most heavily targeted continent,” accounting 
for 42% of all land deals and 37% of all hectares transacted across the globe 
from 2012 to 2016.36  Academics and policymakers have thus come to 
characterize “land grabbing” as resource theft by the global north against the 
global south in the form of large-scale land acquisitions.37 
                                                                                                                   
 28 LAND AND EQUITY MOVEMENT IN UGANDA (LEMU), HOW IS LAND OWNED AND 
MANAGED UNDER CUSTOMARY TENURE? (2008), http://land-in-uganda.org/lemu/document-arc 
hive/information-paper-1-how-is-land-owned-and-managed-under-customary-tenure/. 
 29 Food and Agriculture Org., Land Tenure Studies 3: Land Tenure and Rural Development, 
¶¶ 3.8, 9 (2002), http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4307e/y4307e00.pdf (describing, for example, 
a community land used for grazing, cultivation, collecting water, wild fruits, firewood, building 
materials, and hunting). 
 30 See generally RACHAEL S. KNIGHT, STATUTORY RECOGNITION OF CUSTOMARY LAND 
RIGHTS IN AFRICA (FAO 2012). 
 31 LEMU, supra note 28. 
 32 See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM 
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000).  
 33 RACHAEL KNIGHT ET AL., PROTECTING COMMUNITY LANDS AND RESOURCES: EVIDENCE 
FROM LIBERIA, MOZAMBIQUE AND UGANDA 11 (Namati and the International Development 
Law Organization 2012). 
 34 See PEARCE, supra note 24, at 30. 
 35 Id. 
 36 KERSTIN NOLTE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAND DEALS FOR AGRICULTURE 2 (Land Matrix 
2016). 
 37 See generally Jootaek Lee, Contemporary Land Grabbing, Research, and Bibliography, 
GLOBALEX DATABASE (Jan. 2016), http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Contemporary_Lan 
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Transnational land acquisitions, though grave, are comparatively rare 
today.38  Domestic land grab attempts, on the other hand, occur more 
frequently39 and are more difficult to detect.  These attempts often go 
unreported and occur between members of the same community, clan, or 
even family.40  Despite this fact, in northern Uganda, land-related claims 
constitute an estimated 70% both of crimes reported to police and of lawsuits 
filed in court.41  Such cases are regularly characterized by violence and 
criminal elements such as assault, arson, defilement, homicide, rape, robbery, 
theft, and even witchcraft.42  Moreover, one recent study has tied land 
grabbing and related crimes to substantial shares of local prison populations, 
suggesting the presence of a village-to-prison pipeline.43 
Domestic land grabbing is understood to be a precursor—and the result 
of—transnational land grabs in several ways.44 First, unchecked land 
grabbing within communities may “undermine[ ] the customary tenure 
system by making it appear ineffective in providing tenure security, 
discriminatory by blocking land grabbing attempts, and prohibitive of land 
markets since transactions usually require approval of the clan—thus, 
reinforcing the case for its abolition.”45  Those promoting the land market by 
                                                                                                                   
d_Grabbing.html; TOM BLOMLEY ET AL., ‘LAND GRABBING’: IS CONSERVATION PART OF THE 
PROBLEM OR THE SOLUTION? (International Institute for Environment and Development 2013). 
 38 According to the Land Matrix online database, 1,211 trans-national deals have been 
concluded regarding the legal transfer of over 455 million hectares since 2012, while 1,777 
domestic deals have been concluded regarding just 65 million hectares.  Jacqueline M. Klopp 
& Odenda Lumumba, Kenya and the “Global Land Grab”: A View from Below, in THE 
GLOBAL LAND GRAB: BEYOND THE HYPE 54, 68 (Mayke Kaag & Annelies Zoomers eds., 
2014) (“[W]e need to get beyond the hype and move towards concrete, constructive support 
for local movements struggling with the complex and difficult task of transforming existing 
governance systems.”). 
 39 See Africa’s Real Land Grab, ECONOMIST (July 21, 2016), http://www.economist.com/ 
news/middle-east-and-africa/21702472-never-mind-foreign-interlopers-african-urbanites-are-
scooping-up-more (“If there is a land grab in Africa, it is being done by African urbanites.”). 
 40 See RUGADYA, supra note 6, at 3 (“[In northern Uganda], 20% of all land disputes that 
occur are not reported to any dispute resolution institution; given the severity of land conflicts, 
this is a precursor to social tensions that could erupt into violence.”). 
 41 See AKIN, supra note 9, at 12. 
 42 See JESSE RUDY ET AL., STRENGTHENING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE UGANDAN JUSTICE 
SYSTEM: A MODEL TO SECURE AND PROTECT WIDOW AND ORPHAN LAND RIGHTS 4 
(International Justice Mission ed. 2014); see also AKIN, supra note 9, at 83–91. 
 43 AKIN, supra note 9, at 83–91 (finding that between 39.9% and 53.9% of randomly 
sampled prison inmates in three major government prisons in northern Uganda report their 
charges originating in a land dispute).  For a similar situation in Ethiopia, see WE SAY THE 
LAND IS NOT YOURS: BREAKING THE SILENCE AGAINST FORCED DISPLACEMENT IN ETHIOPIA 
(Oakland Institute 2015), https://www.oaklandinstitute.org/sites/oaklandinstitute.org/files/Bre 
aking%20the%20Silence.pdf. 
 44 MABIKKE, supra note 3.  
 45 AKIN, supra note 9, at 39. 
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freeing up the unutilized or “dead capital” of these rural arable lands 
therefore encourage the imposition of formal systems of tenure that reflect an 
individualized and absolute concept of ownership, rather than the traditional 
model most commonly found in daily village life: bundles of distinct rights 
shared by multiple parties.46  Second, this situation may facilitate an 
environment of impunity that benefits local elites and discourages other 
community members from speaking out, thus creating conditions for dubious 
deals with outside investors.47  Third, as individuals amass more acreage than 
they can utilize effectively, they may choose to sell it off to new settlers or 
migrants at prices higher than what locals are willing or able to pay.48  
B.  Victim-Offender Mediation and Transitional Justice 
In recent decades, the field of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) has 
expanded beyond its civil and juvenile origins and is now practiced in a 
variety of criminal assault and property cases in jurisdictions worldwide.49  
One branch of ADR, restorative justice, recognizes that crime is not simply a 
violation against the state, as has been the norm in Western countries since 
William the Conqueror described crime as a breach of the king’s peace.50  
Rather, it is “a violation of people and relationships.”51  Accordingly, 
achieving justice in these situations necessarily “involves the victim, the 
offender, and the community.”52  One view of restorative justice posits that 
there can be little meaningful resolution as long as underlying tensions that 
                                                                                                                   
 46 See DE SOTO, supra note 32, at 46.  Certificates of Customary Ownership in northern 
Uganda present a diorama of this debate.  See also LEMU, CERTIFICATES OF CUSTOMARY 
OWNERSHIP ARE NOT WHAT THEY SEEM ON THE SURFACE: RISKS TO CCOS (May 9, 2017), 
http://land-in-uganda.org/lemu/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Policy_Brief_on_RIsks_to_CCOs 
-30.5.17.pdf. 
 47 See, e.g., Civic Response on Environment & Development, Land Grabbing from the Inside 
Out: Francis Kahwa Becomes the Owner of Bikongoro Village, in UP AGAINST GIANTS: OIL-
INFLUENCED LAND INJUSTICES IN THE ALBERTINE GRABEN IN UGANDA (2015), http://tiuganda.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/oil-influenced-land-injustices-in-the-albertine-graben-inuganda.pdf.    
 48 RUGADYA supra note 6, at 19. 
 49 See Umbreit et al., supra note 13 (describing more than 300 such programs in the United 
States and over 1,200 similar programs throughout Europe, Canada, Israel, Japan, Russia, 
South Korea, South Africa, South America, and the South Pacific); see also AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, MEDIATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS: AN ABA ENTERPRISE PROJECT, SURVEY OF 
ADR AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE PROGRAMS (2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/publications/criminaljustice/mediationsurvey.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 50 Flora Go, Mediation as Practiced in the Criminal Law: The Present, the Pitfalls, and the 
Potential, 5, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (2010), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/ 
aba/migrated/dispute/docs/2010_BoskeyEssay_Winner_FloraGo.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 51 HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES: A NEW FOCUS FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE 178 (1990). 
 52 Id. at 179. 
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caused the dispute go unaddressed.53  For instance, an individual may be 
successfully arrested and imprisoned for assault or robbery of survey 
equipment, but the land dispute that provoked his retaliatory actions 
continues to simmer. 
Restorative justice is practiced in a variety of forms worldwide, including 
victim-offender mediation (VOM), community and family group conferencing, 
circle sentencing, and truth and reconciliation commissions.54  Since use of 
restorative justice does not deprive states of the power to prosecute alleged 
offenders later, it can be adapted to complement established criminal justice 
systems.55  VOM is a process whereby victims have the chance to meet their 
offender in a safe setting with the goals of: (1) holding offenders directly 
accountable to the people and communities they have violated, (2) restoring 
the material and emotional losses of victims, (3) providing a range of 
opportunities for solving underlying problems, and (4) fostering public safety 
through community building.56  It can be initiated at any stage in the criminal 
justice process, but in some programs, cases are referred to VOM as a 
diversion from prosecution.  In other programs, police, judges, probation 
officers, prosecutors, defense attorneys, or victim advocates may refer the case 
after a formal admission of guilt, or where the mediation is made a condition to 
probation, as long as the victim wishes to participate.57  Due to high levels of 
reported satisfaction among participants in restorative processes like VOM, 
scholars posit the potential for mediation to extend to other areas of criminal 
law, such as plea bargaining58 and even violent crimes.59  
Some jurisdictions have gone so far as to make victim-offender mediation 
mandatory for certain types of criminal cases.60  Proponents argue that 
requiring VOM at the diversion level approaches victims and offenders 
quickly after the alleged crime is committed and prevents certain types of 
                                                                                                                   
 53 Id.  See also MARGARITA ZERNOVA, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: IDEALS AND REALITIES (2007). 
 54 Economic and Social Council Res. 2016/17, Restorative Justice in Criminal Matters, 3 
(July 26, 2016). 
 55 Id. at 2. 
 56 MARK S. UMBREIT, Restorative Justice Through Victim Offender Mediation, in DIALOGUE-
DRIVEN VICTIM OFFENDER MEDIATION TRAINING MANUAL: A COMPOSITE COLLECTION OF 
TRAINING RESOURCE MATERIALS 9–10 (Mark S. Umbreit & Ted Lewis eds., Center of 
Restorative Justice & Peacemaking, School of Social Work, University of Minnesota (2015)). 
 57 Id. at 91. 
 58 Id. at 24. 
 59 Ilyssa Wellikoff, Victim-Offender Mediation and Violent Crimes: On the Way to Justice, 
5 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1 (2003). 
 60 Such as those involving drunk-driving (South Bend, Indiana); robbery (Dallas, Texas); and 
sexual assault, rape, battery, and burglary (La Cross, Wisconsin).  See ABA supra note 49. 
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parties, such as juveniles, from entering the court system.61  Critics, on the 
other hand, argue that compulsory mediation may undermine the legitimacy 
of the process and thus the durability of any agreement reached.62  In his 
review of ninety empirical studies on the impact of restorative programs like 
VOM and family group conferencing throughout the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and Canada, Mark Umbreit includes “voluntary consent 
and self-determination” in his list of identified best practices.63  He observes 
that when an offender is forced to participate regardless of whether he takes 
responsibility, the process becomes agreement-focused (as opposed to 
dialogue-focused) and its restorative impact is weakened.64  Other 
fundamental principles and best practices include: 
 
 Impartial role and thorough training 
of facilitators 
 VOM can occur at any point in 
the criminal justice system 
 Involvement of crime victims in 
VOM 
 Confidentiality and non-legal 
facilitation 
 Preparation of the victim, offender, 
and other support persons 
 Positive presence of the 
mediator/facilitator 
 Creating a safe place for dialogue in all 
pre-joint sessions and joint sessions 
 Voluntary consent and self-
determination 
 Not rushing the process; holding 
multiple meetings as needed 
 Unimpeded direct face-to-face 
dialogue 
 Community-based organizations 
working in partnership with criminal 
justice system 
 Signed, trackable reparation 
agreements 
 Genuine support from police, 
prosecutors, and judges for VOM 
 
Source: Umbreit (2015) at 27. 
 
Restorative justice has natural resonance with the principles of 
transitional justice.  Transitional justice situations are those in which whole 
populations who have experienced trauma or loss have the opportunity to 
build a new social and legal order so as to end cycles of systemic human 
rights abuses.65  Both restorative and transitional brands of justice are 
“alternatives” to the liberal rule of law which emphasize a constructive 
                                                                                                                   
 61 Lora Elizabeth Gallagher, Note, Detour Ahead: Victim-Offender Mediation as a 
Mandatory Deviation Program for Juveniles (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2225301. 
 62 Braithwaite, supra note 14, at 425.  
 63 See UMBREIT, supra note 56, at 27–29. 
 64 Id. 
 65 INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUST., What is Transitional Justice? (2016), https://www. 
ictj.org/about/transitional-justice. 
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process of conflict resolution that considers emotion and “hidden layer[s]” of 
issues underlying the conflict.66  Both attempt to break complex conflicts 
down into smaller, more manageable problems that are partly resolvable by 
using distinct—but complementary—strategies.  And both promote 
community work and empowerment.  As Michal Alberstein, Senior Law 
Lecturer at Bar Ilan University, observes: 
Transitional Justice processes usually utilize aboriginal 
practices and local reconciliation mechanisms and turn them 
into modern tribunals which help to transform the violent 
regime into a peaceful one.  In a similar way that ADR strives 
to abate traditional court paternalism and empower the sides of 
a conflict, Transitional Justice places the burden of problem-
solving in the hands of the local or newly founded regime.67 
A number of criticisms surround restorative justice as practiced in post-
conflict settings.  First, an important assumption of restorative and transitional 
approaches is that the parties’ grievances concern acts or omissions that 
occurred primarily in the past.  Yet when criminal activity is ongoing, critics 
observe that ADR may not muster the economic, law-enforcement, normative, 
or political leverage needed to halt the perpetrator and reach a meaningful 
resolution to the crime-based conflict.  James Cockayne, writing for the Centre 
for Humanitarian Dialogue, explains it this way: 
[W]hen one of those parties’ agendas is precisely to continue 
flouting the law and manipulating formal political settlements 
for its own benefit, the ground for negotiated solutions may turn 
out to be very narrow.  It may only be through the application of 
other more normative and coercive tools, going well beyond the 
traditional toolkit of mediators, that the necessary additional 
common ground can ultimately be carved out and criminal 
agendas effectively managed.68  
Second, an at-large perpetrator has little incentive to voluntarily attend a 
mediation meeting, since dialogue about the underlying origins of the dispute 
may threaten his pecuniary and penal interests.  
                                                                                                                   
 66 Michal Alberstein, ADR and Transitional Justice as Reconstructing the Rule of Law, 
2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 127, 132.  
 67 Id. at 142–43. 
 68 James Cockayne, Strengthening Mediation to Deal with Criminal Agendas, Oslo Forum 
Papers, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, No. 002, 22 (2013) (emphasis added). 
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Third, power imbalances between rich landed elites and poor illiterate 
villagers outside the mediation may drastically narrow the victim’s range of 
perceived options to practically resolve the dispute.  Power may be 
“transmitted and diffused by means of favoritism, kinship, personal ties, 
marriage bonds, family relationship, and political affiliation,” in addition to 
physical strength, gender, level of education, socioeconomic status, and 
ethnicity.69  
Fourth, successful criminal ADR intervention assumes an enabling 
environment of trust between the judiciary, police, the mediator, and other 
facilitating stakeholders such as social workers, family members, and local 
political leaders.  In reality, however, corruption and political patronage 
often characterize transitional justice contexts.70  
Informal versions of victim-offender mediation are already practiced in post-
conflict societies like northern Uganda, where community-based practitioners 
work in parallel to a state justice system that may be inaccessible or unreliable.  
Yet unlike in other parts of the world, criminal ADR in transitional justice 
settings may be conducted without the backing of the state and before any guilt 
has been determined.71  This is a key difference that reveals a host of 
complexities.  Where land grabbing may have gone on for generations in a 
transitional society, the perpetrator of a current land grab attempt may actually 
be the victim of an earlier land grab, or vice versa.  And since land conflicts 
frequently involve families and clans with multiple members, culpability may lie 
with some members of a clan, but not with others.  The need to practically 
negotiate these social and territorial relationships suggests why existing forms of 
criminal ADR have historically been practiced by local traditional authorities 
without significant state involvement. 
C.  Uganda’s Dispute Resolution Landscape 
Uganda, like many other post-colonial nations, is layered in complexity. 
The State’s 1995 Constitution recognizes four coexisting tenure systems: 
customary, leasehold, mailo,72 and freehold.73  Its 1998 Land Act specifies 
                                                                                                                   
 69 P. Tat & D.M. Bagshaw, A Search for Justice and Rights in Land Dispute Resolution in 
Cambodia, 32 CONFLICT RES. Q. 217 (2014). 
 70 Cockayne, supra note 68. 
 71 See generally AKIN, supra note 9. 
 72 A legacy of colonial rule, this system of landlord-tenant ownership is only found in the 
central and western parts of the country. 
 73 CONST. OF UGANDA (1995) § 237(3).  According to Uganda’s Land Act, Cap. 227 (1998), 
“customary tenure” “means a system of land tenure regulated by customary rules which are 
limited in their operation to a particular description or class of persons” (§ 1(l)); “leasehold” 
tenure “means the holding of land for a given period from a specified date of commencement, 
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two courts of first instance for matters relating to contested ownership of 
customary lands: traditional (clan) courts and Local Council 2 (government) 
Courts.74  Moreover, decades of armed conflict between the Lord’s 
Resistance Army and the Uganda People’s Defense Forces have led to the 
forced displacement of approximately 2 million people, constituting 8% of 
the national population and 94% of the northern region by the time the 
insurgency ended.75  Under these circumstances, the multiplicity of land 
tenures and dispute resolution systems, combined with the fact that the 
majority of plots in the country are owned customarily and without 
documents,76 created prime conditions for poverty, forum shopping, and 
impunity.77  While the numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) have 
drastically reduced—the International Displacement Monitoring Center 
estimates less than 30,000 IDPs remained as of May 201578—the number of 
land disputes is “ever increasing.”79  In 2008, a World Bank study found that 
65% of all household lands “left behind” during displacement in Lango and 
Acholi, subregions of northern Uganda, were in dispute.80 
To date, neither the state nor traditional justice systems have proven 
adequate to handle this rising tide of land litigation in northern Uganda.81  
First, in the state civil legal system, a backlog of undisposed cases renders 
civil land suits costly, confusing, and extremely time-intensive for rural 
parties.82  For example, by July 2010, the Chief Magistrate Court in Gulu had 
55.9% of its civil suits outstanding.83  By the end of December 2013, the 
                                                                                                                   
on such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon by the lessor and lessee” (§ 1(s)); and 
“freehold” tenure “means the holding of registered land in perpetuity subject to statutory and 
common law qualifications” (§ 1(p)). 
 74 See LAND ACT, Cap. 227 (1998), §§ 76(a), 88 (as amended 2004). 
 75 COUNTING THE COST: TWENTY YEARS OF WAR IN NORTHERN UGANDA 7 (Civil Society 
Organizations for Peace in Northern Uganda (CSOPNU) 2006), https://www.oxfam.org/sites/ 
www.oxfam.org/files/uganda.pdf.  
 76 Country-wide, customary land accounts for anywhere from 65.5% to 80%.  Government 
of Uganda Board of Statistics (UBOS) National Household Survey for 2005/2006, at S.a2bq7; 
JUDY ADOKO & SIMON LEVINE, LAND MATTERS IN DISPLACEMENT: THE IMPORTANCE OF LAND 
RIGHTS IN ACHOLILAND AND WHAT THREATENS THEM 54 (CSOPNU & LEMU) (2004). 
 77 RUGADYA, supra note 6, at 21. 
 78 INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTER, FIGURES ANALYSIS: UGANDA (IDMC 
2016), http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/uganda/figures-analysis. 
 79 Government of Uganda, Ministry of Lands, Housing, and Urban Development, National 
Land Policy ¶ 116(vii) (February 2013). 
 80 MARGARET RUGADYA ET AL., NORTHERN UGANDA LAND STUDY, ANALYSIS OF POST 
CONFLICT LAND POLICY AND LAND ADMINISTRATION: A SURVEY OF IDP RETURN AND 
RESETTLEMENT, ISSUES AND LESSONS: ACHOLI AND LANGO REGIONS 55 (World Bank) (2008). 
 81 See generally Rose Nakayi, The Role of Local Council Courts and Traditional Institutions 
in Resolving Land Disputes in Post-Conflict Northern Uganda, 7 MALAWI L.J. 119 (2013). 
 82 See AKIN, supra note 9, at 96. 
 83 MABIKKE, supra note 3, at 12–13. 
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Chief Magistrate Court in Lira had 90.5% of its reported land cases 
outstanding.84  This backlog is partly the product of a high volume of cases 
as well as inefficiencies associated with the translation of proceedings into 
English.  Magistrates’ visits of the locus in quo, which require scheduled 
time outside of court, transportation, and official per diems paid by litigants, 
also contribute to the slow handling of land litigation.85  
Second, some magistrates’ attitudes in northern Uganda remain generally 
negative towards customary tenure and traditional justice mechanisms.86  Formal 
rulings, therefore, tend to emphasize statutory law and formally documented 
findings rather than analysis of oral and physical evidence regarding customary 
land rights—signaling a disadvantage to parties who do not have a lawyer.  
Third, court judgments are “rendered unenforceable” while a case is on 
appeal,87 which may take years to process, and only eventuate in remand to 
lower Local Council Courts (LCCs).  LCCs are widely known to lack 
meaningful remuneration, training, supervision, and power to enforce their 
decisions, resulting in “highly imperfect and chaotic functioning, which 
affects their ability to dispense justice that meets the minimum human rights 
standards.”88  Even once a final judgment is rendered, hiring a court broker 
or police to force compliance upon a contemptible party (usually the victim’s 
neighbor) is financially prohibitive and may ignite existing grievances.89 
In the state criminal legal system, police in northern Uganda apply a 
hands-off approach to domestic land disputes, referring parties instead to 
court or mediation.90  As a District Police Commander in Lango subregion 
explained, “[P]olice do not handle land cases. . .  We don’t have the power to 
handle the root cause.”91  Even when police are involved, community 
members may be suspicious.  National studies cite “[u]nresolved corruption 
allegations against the judiciary, police and district authorities alike” as a 
major “conflict driver” in northern Uganda,92 and “[s]everal commissions of 
inquiry and parliamentary audits have revealed widespread and systemic 
corruption in the army, police, judiciary, revenue authority, national social 
                                                                                                                   
 84 See AKIN, supra note 9, at 97. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 68, 72–74. 
 87 Interview with (name withheld), Grade 1 Magistrate, Katakwi, Uganda (Apr. 9, 2013).   
 88 Nakayi, supra note 81, at 121. 
 89 AKIN, supra note 9, at 59. 
 90 Id. at 67.  
 91 Interview with (name withheld), District Police Commander, Lango Subregion, Uganda 
(May 6, 2013). 
 92 ADVISORY CONSORTIUM ON CONFLICT SENSITIVITY (ACCS), NORTHERN UGANDA 
CONFLICT ANALYSIS 76 (2013). 
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security fund, [Office of the Prime Minister], and the Ministry of Finance.”93  
In 2014, Transparency International’s East African Bribery Index ranked 
Uganda’s police the single most bribery prone institution in East Africa; 
Uganda’s Land Services came in at number five.94  
Likewise, the plurality of traditional courts and their existence parallel to 
the formal system severely limit their capacity to dispense justice in land 
cases. Since these institutions are self-regulating, their procedures and 
decisions are sometimes based on “common sense rather than customary 
law” and discriminatory against women and children.95  Even where a clan 
court does uphold land rights of their vulnerable members, the clan’s lack of 
legal enforcement power allows perpetrators to either refuse to comply with 
the decision and not appeal, or remove the case to state court.96  Despite 
these imperfections, studies show that citizens in northern Uganda prefer to 
bring their land dispute to a traditional authority.97  ADR initiatives—as 
applied by legal aid service providers, civil society organizations, and 
various government officials, often to supplement efforts of state and 
traditional justice mechanisms—have achieved a degree of success in 
managing good faith land disputes in northern Uganda.98  
In cases where parties exhibit bad faith, however, mediation fails to resolve 
land disputes for several reasons.  First, because mediation is voluntary, 
perpetrators of land grabbing may refuse to attend the mediation in the first 
place or insist upon a biased mediator.  Second, non-binding settlement 
agreements may not be respected in subsequent proceedings should the case 
end up in formal court, and may not adequately consider land rights or 
                                                                                                                   
 93 Id. at 6 (citing Report of Judicial Inquiry into Corruption in the UGANDA POLICE FORCE 
(2000), https://books.google.co.ug/books/about/Report_of_the_Judicial_Commission_of_Inq. 
html?id=1g0VAQAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y). 
 94 Out of fifty sectors from five countries.  See Transparency International, “Aggregate 
Index,” East African Bribery Index 2 (2014), http://www.tikenya.org/index.php/the-east-afric 
an-bribery-index.  
 95 Nakayi, supra note 81, at 130. 
 96 Judy Adoko & Jeremy Akin, Is the Clan Justice System Ready to Assume a Greater Role 
in Land Administration, as Provided for in the 2013 Uganda National Land Policy?, LEMU 
(2014), http://land-in-uganda.org/lemu/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/are-clan-courts-discrimin 
atory.pdf.  
 97 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION, UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAMME, AND NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL, LAND OR ELSE: LAND-BASED CONFLICT, 
VULNERABILITY, AND DISINTEGRATION IN NORTHERN UGANDA 33 (2010); UGANDA LAND 
ALLIANCE, MILESTONES TOWARDS THE INTEGRATION OF INFORMAL JUSTICE MECHANISMS INTO 
THE FORMAL DYSTEM: FINDINGS FROM AMURU, APAC, AND KATAKWI DISTRICTS 15 (ULA 2010). 
 98 See BURKE & KOBUSINGYE, supra note 26; see also JEREMY AKIN & ISAAC KATONO, 
EXAMINING THE ADR-TISTRY OF LAND DISPUTE MEDIATORS IN NORTHERN UGANDA 88 
(Northern Uganda Land Partners Platform 2011), http://land-in-uganda.org/lemu/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/08/LAND_ADR-tistry_2011-Final.pdf.  
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underlying tensions between the parties and their families that sparked the 
dispute in the first place.  Third, where a land dispute is characterized by 
extreme power imbalances, violence, intimidation, or criminal activity, both 
mediators and parties may fear for their safety and the presence of police 
officers during a mediation session may undermine the voluntariness of the 
dialogue.  As a result, the primary strategy of mediators in these cases is 
referral to another institution, agency or individual with greater power to 
confront the perpetrator and stop the land grabbing attempt.  Since virtually all 
referrals from ADR processes are to the state or traditional justice systems, 
vulnerable victims can break this cycle either by persevering until the 
aggressor backs down, giving up and conceding their land, or forcefully 
retaliating at the risk of bodily harm or imprisonment.  (See Figure 1 below.) 
 
Figure 1: NORTHERN UGANDA’S VILLAGE-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 
Source: Akin (2014) 
 
A recent study of 110 land grabbing attempts that had undergone 
mediation facilitated by nongovernment organizations or clan authorities 
revealed that, in all but three cases, the dispute was still ongoing years later.99  
Similarly, of the prison inmates who reported that their charges arose from a 
land-related dispute, three-quarters indicated they had previously attempted 
to mediate the dispute outside of court.100  This data supports findings from 
previous research that indicate a continual rise in the number of land disputes 
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and a decrease in the percentage of land dispute caseloads factually and 
sustainably resolved.101  In sum, ordinary mediation has so far proven 
inadequate to handle land grabbing attempts in northern Uganda.  
III.  THE DUTY TO DEVELOP APPROPRIATE RESOLUTION SYSTEMS 
Under international law, designing effective systems for land dispute 
resolution is not simply a good idea; it is a state’s legal duty.  This section 
outlines the legal framework for designing effective criminal justice 
complements to land dispute resolution systems in post-crisis nations such as 
Uganda.   
A.  The Kampala Convention102 
The African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of 
Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, commonly known as the Kampala 
Convention, entered into force on December 6, 2012.  According to the 
Norwegian Refugee Council, “it is the world’s first continental instrument 
that legally binds governments to protect the rights and wellbeing of people 
forced to flee their homes by conflict, violence, disasters, and human rights 
abuses.”103  The Convention is a unifying framework that allows for diverse 
application by each of its African member nations.  Civil society experts hold 
it up as a model for the other reported 127 countries worldwide that are 
currently affected by internal displacement.104 
The Convention defines displacement as “the involuntary or forced 
movement, evacuation, or relocation of persons or groups of persons within 
internationally recognized state borders.”105  In an effort to discourage 
“harmful practices”106 and address the consequences of displacement, the 
                                                                                                                   
 101 See AKIN & KATONO, supra note 98, at 32. 
 102 Kampala Convention, supra note 16.  
 103 NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL AND INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CENTRE, THE 
KAMPALA CONVENTION TWO YEARS ON: TIME TO TURN THEORY INTO PRACTICE, Briefing Paper 1 
(Dec. 8, 2014), http://www.internal-displacement.org/sub-saharan-africa/kampala-convention/; 
see Kampala Convention, supra note 16, art. 1(k) (defining “Internally Displaced Persons” as 
“persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or 
places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed 
conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made 
disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized state border”).  
 104 Expert Statement on Internally Displaced Persons at Georgetown University (June 28, 
2016), http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/Uploads/IDP-Expert-Statement-Septembe 
r-Summit2.pdf. 
 105 Kampala Convention, supra note 16, art. 1(k). 
 106 Id. art. 1(j). 
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Convention obligates state parties to “[e]nsure individual responsibility for 
acts of arbitrary displacement” in accordance with applicable domestic and 
international criminal law.107  Notably, the text devotes an entire article to 
preventing “displacement induced by projects” carried out by public or 
private actors.108  This is significant because it tasks States to hold 
individuals criminally accountable for causing unlawful forced evictions, 
regardless of the intended “development project” purpose or how many 
victims are displaced.  
Under the Convention, States are also required to design and establish 
“appropriate mechanisms providing for simplified procedures where 
necessary, for resolving disputes relating to the property of internally 
displaced persons.”109  It goes on to say that “State Parties shall endeavor to 
protect communities with special attachment to, and dependency, on land 
due to their particular culture and spiritual values from being displaced from 
such lands, except for compelling and overriding public interest”110 and 
“shall take all appropriate measures, whenever possible, to restore the lands 
of communities with special dependency and attachment to such lands upon 
the communities’ return, reintegration, and reinsertion.”111  Although it does 
not define what constitutes “special dependency and attachment” to 
particular lands, the Convention seems to suggest that pastoral communities 
fit into this category. 
B.  Relevant Declarations and Guidance 
Due to the recurring and grave nature of land-and-natural-resource-related 
conflicts across the globe, the United Nations and its agencies have adopted a 
host of declarations and guidance for mediation practitioners. This paper 
highlights the most salient of these in the context of designing systems to 
handle intra-community land grabs in transitional justice contexts.  
1. Declarations 
Sets of globally recognized principles illuminate the rights and 
obligations of various stakeholders who participate in systems for land 
dispute resolution and criminal justice. 
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First, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights unequivocally states: 
“No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”112  It also sets forth the 
rights of those criminally charged to a “fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal,”113 to be presumed innocent until proven 
guilty,114 and not to be subjected to “arbitrary detention, arrest, or exile.”115  
In 2007, the United Nations more precisely articulated the right to property 
in contexts where land may be held under customary tenure.  The 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples provides that:  
States shall establish and implement, in conjunction with 
indigenous peoples concerned, a fair, independent, impartial, 
open and transparent process, giving due recognition to 
indigenous peoples’ laws, traditions, customs and land tenure 
systems, to recognize and adjudicate the rights of indigenous 
peoples pertaining to their lands, territories and resources, 
including those which were traditionally owned or otherwise 
occupied or used.116  
It goes on to establish the right of indigenous peoples to access fair conflict 
resolution procedures and effective remedies, decisions of which “shall give 
due consideration to the customs, traditions, and legal systems of the 
indigenous peoples concerned and international human rights.”117  Taken 
together, these two declarations assert the right of holders of land under 
customary tenure to not have their land grabbed away from them, and to have 
access to an impartial system for the resolving of any disputes over their lands. 
2.  Guidance for States and Mediators 
Through a variety of resolutions, the member states of the U.N. have 
repeatedly recognized and called for improved mediation strategies and 
frameworks that contemplate victim-offender mediation for crimes in 
transitional justice contexts.118  In response to a 2012 resolution by the U.N. 
                                                                                                                   
 112 G.A. Res. 217(III)(A), Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 17(2) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
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 114 Id. art. 11(1). 
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General Assembly,119 the Secretary-General, in consultation with Member 
States and other relevant actors, developed the Guidance for Effective 
Mediation in order to more fully tap the potential of this conflict resolution 
strategy by applying lessons learned from past and ongoing mediation 
processes.  Regarding criminalized disputes, it advises that mediators 
“[e]xplore with the conflict parties and other stakeholders the timing and 
sequencing of judicial and non-judicial approaches to address crimes 
committed during the conflict.”120  The Guidance also advises that mediators 
be familiar with principles of “international criminal law, including, where 
applicable, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” and 
“normative [societal] expectations . . . regarding justice, truth, and 
reconciliation, the inclusion of civil society, and the empowerment and 
participation of women in the process.”121  
Three years later, the U.N. developed a specialized Guidance for 
Mediation of Natural Resource Conflicts, that spoke directly to the criminal 
elements of land disputes and the importance of collaborative design of 
mediation processes.122  As it observes,  
Illegal exploitation . . . of extractive resources combined with 
organized criminality is frequently a factor driving conflict in 
resource-rich areas that have weak governance, instability, or 
armed conflict.  The individuals, groups, and companies 
working outside the law are typically interested in perpetuating 
the conditions under which they profit, and may try to 
undermine initiatives aimed at changing the status quo.123 
                                                                                                                   
“exerting influence over parties” and the need to enhance their participation “at all stages of 
mediation and post-conflict resolution” processes.  Id. ¶ 18.  Another calls on “Member 
States . . . the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations, to continue to 
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prevention and resolution, to enable . . . the effectiveness of mediation,” especially within 
developing countries.  G.A. Res. 70/304, Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful 
Settlement of Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution, ¶ 11 (Sept. 9, 2016). 
 119 G.A. Res. 65/283, Strengthening the Role of Mediation in the Peaceful Settlement of 
Disputes, Conflict Prevention and Resolution (July 28, 2011). 
 120 Id. at 17. 
 121 UNITED NATIONS DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS, UNITED NATIONS GUIDANCE FOR 
EFFECTIVE MEDIATION 16 (July 2012). 
 122 UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENTAL PROGRAMME AND UN DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL 
AFFAIRS, NATURAL RESOURCES AND CONFLICT: A GUIDE FOR MEDIATION PRACTITIONERS 30 
(2015). 
 123 Id. 
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At the same time, the Guidance also recommends that “all aspects of the 
process design . . . should be agreed upon by the parties to the mediation” 
because “clear agreement on the process design usually translates into 
greater commitment to the mediation itself.”124  Thus, the tension of needing 
to collaborate with the very parties who have an incentive to evade the 
mediation process is apparent. 
Most recently, U.N. Economic and Social Council Resolution 2016/17 is an 
outgrowth of nearly two decades of work to build States’ capacities to respond 
to crime using restorative justice approaches.  The Resolution emphasizes: 
that restorative justice processes, such as victim-offender 
mediation, community and family group conferencing, circle 
sentencing, peacemaking and truth and reconciliation 
commissions, can contribute to a wide range of beneficial 
outcomes, including redressing the harm done to the victims, 
holding offenders accountable for their actions and engaging 
the community in the resolution of conflict.125  
It “encourages Member States, where appropriate, to facilitate restorative 
justice processes . . . through the establishment of procedures or guidelines” 
and further acknowledges the need to “provid[e] technical assistance to 
developing countries and countries with economies in transition, upon 
request . . . to assist them in the development and implementation of 
restorative justice programmes.”126  The resolution also calls on the U.N. 
Office of Drugs and Crime to “develop” and “disseminate information on 
successful restorative justice models and practices” for practitioners working 
in the areas of crime prevention and criminal justice.127  
Lastly, the U.N. Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, 
adopted December 17, 2015, acknowledge the value of maintaining healthy 
relations with members of their home communities.128  This is crucial 
because to do so may require dialogue to resolve any land disputes that 
underlie the trigger crime for which the inmate is incarcerated.  These rules 
articulate the following standards: 
                                                                                                                   
 124 Id. at 21. 
 125 Economic and Social Council Res. 2016/17, Restorative Justice in Criminal Matters, ¶ 3 
(July 26, 2016). 
 126 Id. ¶¶ 3, 5. 
 127 Id. ¶ 6. 
 128 G.A. Res. 70/175, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nelson 
Mandela Rules) (Dec. 17, 2015), https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-refor 
m/GA-RESOLUTION/E_ebook.pdf. 
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  The treatment of prisoners should emphasize not their 
exclusion from the community but their continuing part in 
it. . . .129  
  “Steps should be taken to safeguard, to the maximum 
extent compatible with the law and the sentence . . . social 
security rights and other social benefits of prisoners.”130  
  From the beginning of a prisoner’s sentence, consideration 
shall be given to his or her future after release and he or 
she shall be encouraged and provided assistance to 
maintain or establish such relations with persons or 
agencies outside the prison as may promote the prisoner’s 
rehabilitation and the best interests of his or her family.131 
These Rules further encourage prison administrations “to use, to the extent 
possible, conflict prevention, mediation or any other alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism to prevent disciplinary offences or to resolve 
conflicts.”132  
C.  Ugandan National Law 
Uganda’s 1995 Constitution and 1998 Land Act expressly recognize 
customary tenure as legitimate forms of ownership with or without title 
documents, but by the 2010s, glaring problems related to land governance 
and dispute resolution persisted. To address these issues and clarify a holistic 
implementation plan, the Government of Uganda adopted a National Land 
Policy in 2013.133  The Policy pays special attention to the historically 
undermined role of customary tenure by acknowledging that “customary 
tenure continues to be: regarded and treated as inferior to other forms of 
registered property rights . . . assessed as lesser regarding dispute resolution 
and mediation compared to the statutory system,” “as lesser to other tenures 
that have titles for proof of ownership in courts of law in the administration 
of justice,” and “disparaged and sabotaged in preference for other forms of 
registered tenures.”134  It explicitly affirms that “[t]he State shall recognize 
customary tenure in its own form to be at par (same level) with other tenure 
                                                                                                                   
 129 Id. at Rule 88(1). 
 130 Id. at Rule 88(2). 
 131 Id. at Rule 107. 
 132 Id. at Rule 38(1). 
 133 Government of Uganda, supra note 79. 
 134 Id. ¶ 38. 
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systems” and that “land disputes resolution mechanisms will be reformed to 
facilitate speedy and affordable resolution of land disputes,” by, inter alia: 
iii) “permit[ting] hierarchal application of state and customary 
law depending on the circumstances, facts, and 
characteristics of the dispute in question”; 
iv) “accord[ing] precedence to indigenous principles and 
practice in dispute management institutions in respect of 
disputes over land held under customary land tenure”; and  
viii) “[e]ncourag[ing] and build[ing] capacity for alternative 
dispute resolution on land matters and application of 
principles of natural justice.”135  
Similar to the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Uganda’s 
policy reiterates a self-imposed mandate to develop effective systems to 
address all land disputes, whether characterized by good faith or otherwise. 
IV.  MANDATORY CRIMINAL ADR AS A TOOL FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE  
In Western countries where criminal ADR is well established, victim-
offender mediations are usually136 voluntary.  In other words, if the offender 
does not admit responsibility or the victim is not interested, neither party is 
required to participate.  Yet in post-conflict societies, a voluntary and non-
binding mediation process allows powerful parties to disregard local 
traditional methods of dispute resolution and proceed directly to the state 
court system, where they may enjoy financial or practical advantages that 
maintain the status quo and hinder resolution of land conflicts.  The complex 
nature of land grabbing cases—where victims may also be perpetrators, and 
vice versa—demands a creative new approach to mediation if this method is 
to be effective and avoid laying the foundation for new grievances between 
parties in future generations.  Establishing a mandatory ADR complement to 
the criminal justice system, whereby parties who are arrested and accused of 
a land-related crime along with their accusers are required to undergo 
victim-offender mediation, is one possible solution. Using the case of 
northern Uganda, this section explores the potential benefits, limits, and 
feasibility of mandatory criminal ADR to undergird land tenure security as a 
fundamental pillar of transitional justice and conflict prevention. 
                                                                                                                   
 135 Id. ¶¶ 39(a), 115(b), 116(iii, iv, viii).  
 136 See Wellikoff, supra note 59. 
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A. The Potential of Mandatory Criminal ADR in Transitional Societies 
Once law enforcement has knowledge to a substantial certainty that the 
trigger crime is associated with a land dispute, a system of mandatory 
criminal ADR would require an initial mediation session, whereby victims, 
offenders, community leaders, and other interested stakeholders of both the 
trigger crime and the underlying land dispute are compelled to sit down and 
discuss the harm caused and available options.  If made compulsory, this 
practice could improve the efficacy of existing land dispute management 
systems in transitional justice settings in notable ways. 
To aid analysis, consider the scenario described in the quote by a detained 
suspect in the introduction.  Here, the suspect is charged with aggravated 
robbery of survey equipment (the trigger crime) that springs from what is 
possibly a bad faith land dispute (the current land grab).  The current dispute 
may be informed by a separate pre-existing dispute that originated before the 
war or during the period of displacement (the previous land grab). 
 
Table 1: LAYERED CULPABILITY OF PARTIES 
 Role in Trigger Crime 
(i.e., robbery) 
Role in Current 
Land Grab 
Role in Previous Land 
Grab 
(if applicable) 
1 
Victim = 
Victim = Victim 2 Perpetrator 
3 Perpetrator = Victim 4 Perpetrator 
 
5 
Perpetrator = 
Victim = Victim 6 Perpetrator 
7 Perpetrator = Victim 8 Perpetrator 
1.  Enhanced Due Process 
A system of mandatory victim-offender (VO) mediation for land dispute-
related crimes enhances due process rights of both victims and offenders, 
regardless of their category of culpability.  Procedurally, it protects detained 
suspects’ right to be heard by giving them the power to compel their identified 
adversaries, together with community leaders, to attend a dialogue to resolve 
the underlying problem in the presence of an impartial facilitator.  In this way, 
mandatory VO mediation safeguards a suspect’s right to confront the witnesses 
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against him before he is detained indefinitely137 awaiting trial.  If facilitated by 
impartial community-based leaders with support of state officials, this 
mediation would allow victims and offenders to keep their land disputes 
“local.”  Since local land dispute resolution processes are generally considered 
cheaper, less corrupt, less burdensome with regard to travel, faster, more 
efficient, easier to understand, and more effective in promoting reconciliation 
than decisions by government agents or the judiciary,138 this could provide a 
fairer and more accessible process to both victims and offenders, many of 
whom must go on living as neighbors after the formal legal system has run its 
course.  VO mediation systems could also be structured to give a central role to 
women.  When their fathers, uncles, brothers, husbands, and sons are in state 
custody, it is women who typically visit them, bring food, and relay messages 
from the community.  If structured to give a central role to women, VO 
mediations could tap the power of these female community members to 
influence parties for negotiated resolution to conflicts. 
Mandatory VO mediation can also strengthen the substantive due process 
of victims of the current land grab (Categories 1–2 and 5–6 above) in that 
persons who attempt to grab land by jailing their opponent will now be 
forced to comply with the system they once tried to manipulate.  Knowledge 
of the general outcome of a mandatory initial mediation, perhaps in the form 
of a generic report written by the mediator afterwards specifying reasons 
why the mediation failed, may assist law enforcement to screen the validity 
of the alleged trigger crime victim’s complaint.  This would be the case even 
if the substance of any incriminating statements that parties make during 
mediation were kept confidential and inadmissible in subsequent 
proceedings.139  Such a process would discourage active or potential 
                                                                                                                   
 137 See AKIN, supra note 9, at 87 (finding that the median length of incarceration for inmates 
who say their charges originate from a land dispute is between six and twelve months). 
 138 Christopher W. Moore & Gary Brown, Designing Dispute Resolution Systems for 
Settling Land and Property Disputes in Postconflict and Postcrisis Societies, in BUILDING 
PEACE: PRACTICAL REFLECTIONS FROM THE FIELD 79 (C. Zelizer & R. Rubenstein eds., 2009). 
 139 A mediator’s breach of confidentiality may be justified in certain circumstances in order 
to further public policy interests including ending the widespread impunity surrounding land 
theft, preserving subsistence livelihoods, reducing violence, and strengthening the legitimacy 
of local justice institutions.  Yet, such breaches may only be justified to the extent that the fact 
of bad faith in the case is made known to reliable law enforcement authorities.  Without some 
degree of mediator oversight, misuse of this exception to the rule of confidentiality could 
further jeopardize public trust in both local mediators and state law enforcement.  As the 
Georgia ADR Rules observe, “[I]f the lodestar of mediation is the principle of self-
determination, the unwillingness of a party to bargain in good faith is consistent with that 
party’s right to refuse the benefits of mediation.”  See Georgia Office of Dispute Resolution 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Rules 32 (2014), http://godr.org/sites/default/files/Godr/supre 
me_court_adr_rules/CURRENT%20ADR%20RULES%20COMPLETE%205-28-2014.pdf. 
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perpetrators of land grabbing (Categories 3–4 and 7–8) from provoking 
retaliation by land rights holders, since perpetrators know their bad faith 
actions are likely to be exposed in the course of the discussion and could 
undermine the validity of their accusations.  
2.  Improved Efficiency of Law Enforcement 
Mandatory VO mediations may also enhance the efficiency of the 
criminal justice system and constitute one of the “simplified procedures” for 
resolving property disputes among IDPs called for in the Kampala 
Convention.  It does this by first providing a means for society and law 
enforcement to divert cases that are better addressed outside of court.  If 
cases are resolved through mediation—a process which data suggests a 
majority of inmates are generally interested in140—this would in turn prevent 
cases between neighbors and relatives, which are more comprehensively 
resolved through mediation, from ending up in the already backlogged court 
or overcrowded prison systems.  Second, mandatory VO mediations would 
assist in promoting public safety.  Duty-to-report information141 gleaned 
through VO mediation processes would enable police to obtain leads 
pertinent to underlying community issues, which could be used to investigate 
intra-community tensions and prevent future crimes.  Third, it allows police 
to confront both the criminal and civil sides of a land grab attempt in one 
forum.  The trigger crime and the land grab attempt can be leveraged in 
mediation concerning the potential success of a party’s legal case, while the 
civil aspects of compensation, apology, and reparation can form the basis for 
possible solutions in any consent agreement.  This has potential to not only 
reduce the formal courts’ caseload, but also benefit parties and their local 
communities who have an interest in maintaining healthy relationships 
between their members.  In turn, the resolution of underlying tensions in 
communities means that law enforcement will probably see fewer reports of 
land-related crimes.  This is significant for places like northern Uganda, 
where land disputes account for an estimated 70% of both crimes reported to 
police and lawsuits filed in court.142  
                                                                                                                   
 140 See AKIN, supra note 9, at 90–91 (finding that among inmates who face charges linked to 
a land dispute, 71% indicate that they prefer mediation, and 67% say they are still interested in 
sitting down to dialogue with their adversary to resolve the dispute).  
 141 Although confidentiality is a key aspect of any mediation, mediators are often under a duty 
to report if a party makes reference to certain types of threatened or pending acts that could harm 
other persons.  An example of this in the United States includes statements made to a mandated 
reporter such as a teacher, social worker, or mediator who learns of child or elder abuse. 
 142 See AKIN, supra note 9, at 12. 
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3.  Improved Coordination Between State and Customary Justice Systems 
Mandating VO mediations for criminal land disputes in post-conflict 
societies provides a regular forum for collaboration among state and 
customary law enforcement.  Land grab attempts cannot be resolved by 
traditional or state authorities alone.  Police and judges may not know or be 
interested in the customary system of land holding in a given region but may 
greatly benefit in terms of efficiency, citizen satisfaction, and public 
legitimacy by employing impartial traditional leaders who hail from the 
community (communities) of the parties to facilitate VO mediations.  By 
lending police authority to traditional land dispute resolution structures for 
land grabbing attempts, clan authorities may be more likely to preemptively 
report land grab attempts to police before violence or trigger crimes are 
committed, since they know police will turn around and look to clan 
leadership to facilitate the mediation with police support.  
The flexibility of the mediation process—in which extrajudicial solutions 
may be developed that benefit entire communities affected—can empower 
local community leaders to begin to collaborate with state law enforcement to 
holistically address all the ongoing land disputes within a given community.  
One such method, successfully applied in Mozambique, is the tenurial shell 
model.143  Under this approach, representatives from a given community agree 
with neighboring landholders on the perimeter boundary or “shell” of the 
community.  With the outer bounds defined, the community members and their 
leaders systematically work to fill in the shell with lines that depict the agreed 
boundaries of individual and family-sized land holdings.144  Agreements 
reached in VO mediation sessions may include re-entry plans for release of 
detained suspects, serving to de-escalate violence in the community and 
promoting the state and customary systems’ joint goal of public safety. 
B.  The Limits of Mandatory Criminal ADR in Transitional Societies 
Several variables endemic to many transitional justice contexts constrain 
the possible impact of a mandatory VO mediation program.  The following 
sections describe some of the biggest challenges to compulsory criminal 
ADR in these situations. 
                                                                                                                   
 143 CHRISTOPHER TANNER ET AL., PARTICIPATORY LAND DELIMITATION: AN INNOVATIVE 
DEVELOPMENT MODEL BASED UPON SECURING RIGHTS ACQUIRED THROUGH CUSTOMARY AND 
OTHER FORMS OF OCCUPATION, FAO 14–15 (Oct. 2009), http://www.fao.org/3/a-ak546e.pdf. 
 144 Id. 
180  GA. J. INT’L & COMP.  L. [Vol. 46:151 
 
 
1.  Resources and Practical Considerations 
A society’s dispute resolution system is only as effective as it is accessible 
to the society’s poorest members.  Rural community members are likely to 
find it difficult to finance their travel from remote villages to towns where the 
court and prison are located.  Since disputes over customary land in sub-
Saharan Africa are typically community-wide affairs—with a network of 
individuals who have a stake in the bundle of property interests attached to a 
particular tract of land—transporting all the key rights bearers and their leaders 
to town to participate in a mediation may be extremely expensive. Community 
members unable to attend the “secret” mediation may also view the process 
with suspicion.  Nevertheless, requiring community members to pay for their 
own transportation to mediation sessions could serve to increase legitimacy of 
the process, since parties who sacrifice in order to obtain a benefit are likely to 
be more invested in the process and in a positive outcome.  
One alternative is to have the authorities bring the detained suspect to the 
community.  But in a largely unregulated post-conflict setting, where local 
communities do not trust police and the detained suspect is a source of 
tension, police and suspect safety is at risk.  Likewise, conducting the 
mediation in a neutral location—nearby enough so as not to be burdensome 
to community members, but far enough away from the community so as to 
dispel home-turf tensions—may be necessary.  Yet this would require 
underfunded police to have fuel and means to transport the suspect to the 
community, a cost that they are likely to pass on to poor communities.  The 
state—probably through its prisons budget—would also be tasked with 
paying mediators reasonable wages to engage in such complex and risky 
work because budget allocations of this kind may require approval by the 
legislature or other authorities, some of which are implicated in corruption 
scandals.  Likewise, because prisons and courts are often understaffed and 
under-resourced, it is unlikely that many post-conflict states would be 
interested in creating jobs in this field anytime soon.  States would be more 
likely to welcome assistance from foreign development agencies or non-
governmental organizations to fund VO mediation initiatives. 
2.  Attitudes of Police and Mediators 
Assumptions based in the worldview and orientations of both police 
officers and mediators may profoundly influence the mediation process and 
2017] ARRESTING THE VILLAGE-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 181 
 
its outcomes.145  If the mediator or police officer operates out of a cultural 
bias, a personal judgment as to the validity of one party’s claim over another, 
or a belief in which option is the best choice for the parties, the parties may 
lose faith in the process or feel pressured to settle on an unsatisfactory 
outcome for the sake of reaching an agreement.  In the same way, a police 
officer who presumes a detained suspect to be guilty before proven innocent 
may be less likely to accord this individual the full benefit of due process.  
Effective intervention in land-related crimes requires acute skill.  The bad 
faith and potentially violent nature of these cases, combined with the 
complex layers of culpability depicted in Table 1; the potential for coerced 
agreements due to power imbalances between parties in custody and their 
unjailed opponents; and the necessity for tactfully impartial responses to 
case-related developments throughout the process mean that mediators who 
handle such cases must be respected by both sides of the dispute, well-
trained in state and customary norms, unafraid, and enduringly patient.  Such 
a mediator may be difficult to find and may be unwilling to participate due to 
fear of physical harm to his position in the community if the parties fail to 
resolve the issue under his leadership.  An effective VO mediation program 
thus requires careful screening, training, and some degree of supervision and 
protection of mediators, especially regarding issues of confidentiality and 
threats of violence.  
3.  Respect for Customary Tenure and Political Will 
Practitioners’ personal beliefs regarding customary tenure as part of the 
“problem” or the “solution” to land dispute resolution impacts the way they 
will view and practically respond to a land grabbing attempt.  If the 
government is not keen on supporting customary tenure in practice, perhaps 
because it feels clan control of land hinders an efficient land market, it will 
have little incentive to encourage meaningful analysis of customary land 
rights of each disputing party in VO mediations.  Furthermore, as Moore and 
Brown observe from their review of mediation efforts in post-conflict 
societies contexts: “case-by-case resolution procedures may settle a number 
of site-specific conflicts, [but] they are not a substitute for land reform and a 
broader distribution and ownership of property.”146  It is therefore crucial that 
any effective effort to combat the systemic problem of land grabbing 
complement a holistic vision for a new system of land dispute resolution that 
equitably appreciates state and customary land rights. 
                                                                                                                   
 145 See generally Gregory D. Paul & Ian M. Borton, Exploring Communities of Facilitators: 
Orientations Toward Restorative Justice, 31 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 189 (2013). 
 146 Moore & Brown, supra note 138, at 92. 
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4.  Systemic Abuse and Corruption  
As in any society with limited or no rule of law, corruption and arbitrary 
arrests are unwelcome realities for many community members who find 
themselves in a land dispute.  This is true in both the traditional and state 
justice systems, as discussed earlier.  Corruption is especially harmful in the 
context of victim offender mediation because the victim of the current land 
grab (Categories 1–2, 5–6) may continue to feel further victimized through 
the process.  Likewise, a perpetrator may bribe or influence police, clan 
chiefs, or even an unscrupulous mediator (who are all likely to be poorly 
paid) to avoid criminal liability for his land grabbing attempt.  A mandatory 
VO mediation program thus requires clear police protocols and safeguards to 
prevent fraud, arbitrary arrests, prolonged detention of suspects without 
evidence, and abuse of the contempt-of-court process.  
C.  The Feasibility of Mandatory Criminal ADR 
The feasibility of a mandatory VO mediation program to address land 
grabbing attempts and land-related crimes is significantly limited by 
environmental factors such as resources, corruption, and attitudes of leadership 
toward customary land tenure.  Similarly, from a process perspective, simply 
compelling a VO mediation session may not eliminate problems regarding the 
deliberate bad faith nature of a land grabbing attempt, especially if the attempt 
is still ongoing.  Deliberate perpetrators of the land grab may continue to call 
the state’s bluff and pursue their own war of attrition in the courts. 
Nevertheless, the potential benefits of the criminal ADR model merit 
serious consideration for at least experimental application in transitional justice 
settings.  Mandatory VO mediation has the potential to change the prevailing 
atmosphere that breeds impunity in the first place because of its ability to 
enhance the due process of suspects detained for alleged land-origin crimes; to 
increase efficiency of law enforcement; and improve coordination between 
state and customary justice actors.  Police are likely to be willing to undertake 
a pilot test of mandatory VO mediation because it stands to give them power to 
investigate the disputes that underlie the trigger crimes they respond to and 
prevent future related crimes; yet they will need to be carefully trained on how 
to analyze customary land rights and how involved they can be in the process 
and content of the actual VO mediation.  Similarly, prisons are likely to 
welcome such an initiative because it would increase their funding to provide 
for mediators and potentially reduce the prison population as well as the 
proportion of total inmates who are detained without having been formally 
charged or convicted.  Customary authorities are likely to be wary of 
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mandatory VO mediation unless they are given a central role in the dispute 
resolution mechanism; thus, it is important that they are intimately involved in 
process design.  Community leaders may also be more apt to embrace the 
process if women are given central positions as well, so that they may use their 
strategic influence to encourage parties to desist from crime and choose 
reconciliation.  
While it may not work in all cases, mandatory VO mediation (required at 
least at the beginning of the criminal justice process) is an effective way to 
divert a significant number of land-related disputes from the already 
overburdened court and prison systems and lead to more satisfactory 
outcomes for parties, thus foreseeably deescalating tensions in the 
community and preventing future crimes.  Mediated cases that do not reach 
meaningful agreement can still proceed to court, but hopefully in fewer 
numbers.  Regardless, courts will still need to devise a way to promptly 
monitor compliance with VO mediation agreements and enable a fast-track 
system for hearing cases that unravel after mediation before renewed 
tensions escalate to violence.  
Practically, although paying mediators necessitates additional funding, 
pilot projects could explore the feasibility of a team of mediators working on 
a largely volunteer basis.  Whether mediators are paid or not, they will need 
to be sufficiently trained, along with police, traditional leaders, lawyers, and 
judges on how VO mediation can supplement—and not supplant—the work 
of the criminal justice system.  Such training should encompass not only 
techniques for mediating power imbalances, victim-sensitive facilitation, and 
navigating confidentiality issues, but also techniques for performing reliable 
land rights analysis such as oral family trees and holistic land delimitation 
measures, like the tenurial shell concept, so that the resolution of one case 
can have spinoff effects to prevent similar future disputes in the community.  
Appropriate feedback loops, vital for successful communication between 
these agencies, mediators, and the parties they serve, must also be developed, 
and the long-term impacts of VO mediation monitored.  
V.  CONCLUSION 
Once the dust of a crisis or war settles, displaced citizens frequently find 
themselves vying for access to and ownership of customary lands.  For African 
member states of the Kampala Convention, international law mandates that 
countries in transition must develop appropriate systems to effectively address 
this rising tide of land disputes. Land disputes in bad faith, however, are 
particularly challenging for mediators in transitional justice settings because 
perpetrators of a land grabbing attempt have little incentive to participate and 
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may completely disregard traditional mediation processes, choosing instead to 
exercise their financial might in formal court.  Interrupting these grassroots 
cycles of land grabbing is crucial if the international community is to achieve 
the universally adopted Sustainable Development Goal of “strengthen[ing] the 
recovery and return of stolen assets and combat all forms of organized crime” 
and “strengthen[ing] relevant national institutions . . . for building capacity at 
all levels, in particular in developing countries, to prevent violence and 
combat . . . crime.”147  Despite this reality, criminal justice solutions to 
community-level land conflicts between villagers and local elites rarely make 
headlines in the global land grab debate.148 
Making victim offender mediation mandatory has the potential to 
positively change the status quo by forcing persons who attempt to illegally 
seize land by jailing their opponent to comply with the system they once 
tried to manipulate.  It can also enhance the due process of both victims and 
offenders of trigger crimes, increase the efficiency of law enforcement by 
diverting away from court those cases that are better resolved in mediation, 
and improve coordination between state and customary justice actors.  
Mandatory VO mediation would also allow the state to expeditiously address 
the civil and criminal aspects of a land grabbing attempt in a single forum. 
Despite this potential, mandatory VO mediation must overcome significant 
obstacles to truly add value to an already complex and inefficient criminal 
justice system.  In particular, it cannot be viewed as a substitute for meaningful 
land governance reform or elimination of institutional corruption.  To be 
effective, VO mediation must be complemented by clear police protocols, land 
rights analysis methods, community-wide land documentation, safeguards to 
hold state and traditional land dispute authorities accountable, and facilitation 
by adequate numbers of patient and skillful mediators.  In a transitional society 
such as northern Uganda, a pilot study should be welcomed to develop best 
practices that may be adapted for use in other jurisdictions that seek more 
effective ways to hold trigger crime offenders accountable while resolving the 
land disputes that so often underlie their actions.  
                                                                                                                   
 147 U.N. Sustainable Development Goal, supra note 15.  
 148  “[W]e need to get beyond the hype and move towards concrete, constructive support for 
local movements struggling with the complex and difficult task of transforming existing 
governance systems.”  Jacqueline M. Klopp & Odenda Lumumba, Kenya and the ‘Global Land 
Grab’: A View from Below, in THE GLOBAL LAND GRAB: BEYOND THE HYPE, supra note 38. 
